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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue I:

The Utah Mechanics' Lien prohibits a lien claimant from waiving or altering

its lien rights by private agreement. The parties entered into an agreement which
required the lien claimant to subordinate its right, including its statutory right of priority,
to the construction lender. Did the trial court err when it concluded this private
agreement did not violate the plain language of the statute?
Standard of Review:

The trial court's statutory interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 38-

1-29 is reviewed for correctness. See S.C v. Anderson, 1999 UT App 251, f8, 987 P.2d
611.
Issue Preserved:

This issue was preserved in the Record at pp. 45-113, 133-160, 274-

283,343.
Issue II:

The only evidence in the record indicated that the party with superior

knowledge of the terms and effect of a document and in superior bargaining position
misrepresented the effect of a document in order to induce the lien claimant's signature
on the document. Did the trial court err when it resolved all factual inferences against the
non-moving party, ignored genuine issues of disputed fact, and improperly applied Utah
law in order to grant the lender's motion for summary judgment?
Standard of Review: On appeal from a summary judgment motion, the appellate court
reviews the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). Whether a party is entitled
to summary judgment presents a question of law and the appellate court grants no
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions and reviews them for correctness. See
1

Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235; Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, 948 P.2d 356: 360 (Utah Ct. App.
1997).
Issue Preserved:

This issue was preserved in the Record at pp. 133-160, 274-283,

343.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)0).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES, AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-29
The applicability of the provisions of this chapter, including the waiver of
rights or privileges granted under this chapter, may not be varied by
agreement.
Utah Code Ann. 38-1-39 is attached in full in the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This appeal arises from a grant of summary judgment to defendants in plaintiffs
action to enforce a mechanics' lien. The issues in this case primarily turn on statutory
interpretation. Along with the statutory interpretation, this case involves the competing
policies of protecting contractors who supply labor and materials in construction projects
versus allowing lenders who finance construction projects to have some protections
against unknown lien claims. In the end, the facts of this case, the application of Utah
law to these facts, and consideration of the applicable policy concerns all support the
2

conclusion that the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion for summary
judgment.
Facts
Maestro Builders agreed to build a home for Matt Hood in 2006. (R. at 49).
According to the testimony of Maestro's principal, Luke Watkins, Maestro started
construction in late October, 2006. (R. at 49, 134). An inspector for Layton City
inspected the foundation footings and issued an inspection report on November 1, 2006.
(R.at 49). Hood entered into a construction loan agreement with First Utah Bank, which
was secured by a deed of trust recorded on the home on November 9, 2006. (R. at 49).
As part of the construction loan, First Utah Bank asked Maestro to sign a "Guaranty of
Completion of Performance." (R. at 138). An agent of First Utah represented to Mr.
Watkins that the Guaranty of Completion required Maestro to complete construction of
the home if Matt Hood died or otherwise did not complete construction. (R. at 138).
As it turns out, the Guaranty of Completion also required Maestro to subordinate
and release any mechanics5 lien rights it had under Utah law. (R. at 159-60). Although
Maestro received payment on some of its draw requests from the construction loan,
Maestro was not paid in full for its work on the Hood home. (R. at 49-50). Accordingly,
Maestro filed a mechanics' lien on the home in order to recover the additional amounts
owed. (R. at 50).
Ultimately, First Utah foreclosed on the home and sold it to Skyline Real Estate at
a non-judicial foreclosure. (R. at 50). Skyline later sold the home to Doug and Chantel
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Chase. (R. at 50). Maestro's lien was recorded against the home prior to the foreclosure
sale and the Chase's subsequent purchase.
Maestro assigned its mechanics' lien to Bradley Olsen, the plaintiff in this action.
(R. at 50). Olsen filed this action to foreclose on the mechanics' lien. (R. at 1).
Defendants answered the complaint and never identified or raised the Guaranty of
Completion as a defense to the action. (R. at 36-42). After filing the suit, Olsen filed a
motion for summary judgment in which he requested a ruling that Maestro's lien had
priority over the First Utah trust deed. (R. at 45-113). After conducting some discovery
during which the Guaranty of Completion was first disclosed, defendants opposed this
motion and argued the Guaranty of Completion required Maestro to subordinate any
rights or interests in favor of First Utah. (R. at 188-266). Defendants filed a cross motion
for summary judgment and requested the Court to find the foreclosure extinguished
Maestro's lien. (R. at 129-132). In response, Olsen argued the mechanics' lien statute in
effect at the time the lien was filed precluded a contractor from entering into a private
agreement that waived or altered its statutory lien rights, and in the alternative, that First
Utah had misrepresented the purpose and effect of the Guaranty of Completion in order
to induce Maestro to sign the agreement. (R. at 133-160).
Procedural Details of Case and Disposition of the Case Below
This appeal arises from the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. Shortly
after filing the complaint, Olsen moved for summary judgment on the issue of the priority
of the mechanics' lien. (R. at 45-46). Olsen argued that the mechanics' lien related back
to the first work performed on the house, and therefore, the lien had priority over the
4

lender's trust deed. (R. at 48-53). Specifically, Olsen identified undisputed issues of fact
to demonstrate visible work commenced on the property not later than November 1,
2009. (R. at 49-50). Since the lender's trust deed was not recorded until November 9,
2009, Olsen argued the applicable mechanics' lien statute gave the mechanics' lien
priority over the lender's trust deed. (R. at 52-53).
After Olsen filed his motion for partial summary judgment, the parties agreed that
defendants would be allowed to take the deposition of Maestro Builders' principal, Luke
Watkins. (R. at 114-121). The evening before Watkins' deposition, defendants provided
Olsen's counsel with additional documents that it intended to use in Watkins' deposition.
These documents contained the Guaranty of Completion that Watkins had signed. This
was the first time Olsen learned of the Guaranty of Completion. Indeed, defendants'
Answer did not identify or assert the Guaranty of Completion, or any other document, as
an affirmative defense to Olsen's lien claim. (R. at 36-42).
After Watkins' deposition, defendants opposed Olsen's motion and filed a cross
motion for summary judgment to have Olsen's lien claim dismissed based on the
Guaranty of Completion. (R. at 129-132, 188-266). Defendants argued the Guaranty of
Completion required the lien claimant to subordinate its lien in favor of the lender's trust
deed. (R. at 189-90) Olsen opposed defendants' cross motion by citing to Watkins'
testimony about the execution of the document and why he signed it. (R. at 133-145).
Specifically, Watkins testified that he did not read the Guaranty of Completion because
the lender misrepresented the effect of the document and suggested that he did not need
to read it. (R. at 138-39). In fact, Watkins testified the lender represented the effect of the
5

document was consistent with the document's title: a Guaranty of Completion and
Performance. (R. at 138-39). Based on this testimony, Olsen argued the Guaranty of
Completion was unenforceable and that issues of fact precluded a grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants. (R. at 143-45). In addition, Olsen argued the
mechanics' lien statute precluded a claimant from waiving or abrogating its lien rights
granted by the Utah Legislature through a private agreement. (R. at 139-42).
The trial court denied Olsen's motion and granted defendants' cross motion. (R. at
294-301). The trial court ruled that Maestro had not actually waived any of its statutory
rights. (R. at 298-99). According to the trial court, the Guaranty of Completion did not
violate the statute because it did not require Maestro to waive any of its statutory rights—
it found the Guaranty of Completion merely subordinated those rights in favor of First
Utah. (R. at 298-99). In part, the trial court based its ruling on its own familiarity with
the industry and what it considered to be standard and necessary practices of lenders. (R.
at 298-99, 343: 3-4). In addition, the trial court ruled that Maestro's failure to read and
comprehend the Guaranty of Completion excused any misrepresentation on the part of
First Utah with respect to inducing Maestro to sign it (R. at 299). The trial court later
awarded defendants' costs and attorney fees under the mechanics' lien statute. (R. at
314-320). This appeal ensued. (R. at 329).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court erred when it ignored the plain language of the mechanics' lien
statute that precludes a claimant from waiving or altering its lien rights under the statute.
The statute unambiguously precludes a lien claimant from altering or waiving any lien
6

rights, and the trial court erred when it concluded a subordination of priority is permitted
under the statute. Furthermore, the trial court substituted its own view of how the
construction industry and lenders should operate in contrast to stated policy of the
Legislature.
The trial court's err was compounded when it rejected Watkins' deposition
testimony regarding the lender's representations concerning the effect of the Guaranty of
Completion. The bank offered no evidence to refute Watkins' testimony. Instead, the
bank argued that Watkins' failure to read the document excused any misrepresentation.
Utah law provides that a signature induced by fraud or artifice is not binding, and the
agreement is rendered unenforceable. The trial court ignored this law, and it found
Watkins' testimony was not "reasonable" in light of the circumstances. The question of
reasonable reliance is a jury question that is not susceptible to resolution on a motion for
summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
I.

The provisions and policy requirements of Utah's mechanics' lien statute
preclude a claimant from waiving or altering its lien rights by private
contract.
The Utah Mechanics' Lien statute contains several provisions and safeguards to

ensure contractors and suppliers are paid for their work and materials. The Utah
Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he purpose and intent of Utah's Mechanic's Lien Act
manifestly has been to protect, at all hazards, those who perform the labor and furnish the
materials which enter into the construction of a building or other improvement. Lien
statutes should be broadly construed to effectuate that purpose." Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT
7

45, f8, 162 P.3d 1099 (quoting Interiors Contracting v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382, 1386
(Utah 1982) (emphasis added)).
In 2006 and in furtherance of the stated purpose of the mechanics' lien statute, the
statute contained an express provision that prevented contractors from waiving or altering
any of their statutory rights to file and enforce mechanics' liens through a private
agreement. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-29 (2006). Specifically, section 38-1-29 is titled
"No waiver of lien rights," and provides: "The applicability of the provisions of this
chapter, including the waiver of rights or privileges granted under this chapter, may not
be varied by agreement." Id.
Utah's mechanics' lien statute tracks the model mechanics' lien statute. Indeed,
similar statutes prohibiting lien waivers exist in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., National
Glass v. J. C Penny Prop., Inc., 650 A.2d 246, 250 (Md. Ct. App. 1994) (Maryland
Mechanic's lien "statute provides clear legislative indication that any provision
attempting to waive the right to a mechanic's lien is void as against the public policy");
Clifton Steel Corp. v. GE9 80 A.D.2d 714, 715 (N.Y. App. Ct. 1981) ("New York law
specifically prohibits any waiver of the right to file or enforce such liens as against public
policy."); Tri-State Mechanical, Inc. v. Northland College, 681 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Wis.
Ct. App 2004) (holding that Wisconsin mechanic's lien waiver was void under statute
and that general purpose of lien law was to protect contractors); Brown and Kerr v.
American Stores Prop., 715 N.E.2d 804, 812 (111. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that Illinois
mechanic's lien statute "prohibits agreements to waive any right to enforce or claim a
lien"). These statutory prohibitions against waiving or abrogating lien rights were put in
8

place to protect lien claimants from the frequent unequal bargaining positions with
respect to lenders. See, e.g., Bentz Plumbing & Heating v. Favaloro, 180 Cal.Rptr. 223,
225-226 (Cal. App. 3rd Dist. 1982) (discussing purpose behind lien statute and lien waiver
provisions).1
In 2007, the Utah Legislature amended the general prohibition on the waiver of
lien rights found in section 38-1-29 for agreements executed after January 1, 2007. See
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-39 (2007). Section 38-1-39 provides: Notwithstanding Section
38-1-29, a written consent by a lien claimant that waives or limits the lien claimant's lien
rights is enforceable only i f the waiver complies with the requirements set forth in the
statute. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, private agreements which purport to waive or limit
lien rights executed after January 1, 2007 are enforceable, but only if the waiver strictly
complies with the statutory requirements set forth in 38-1-39. The important
requirements for a valid waiver or abrogation of lien rights are: (1) a signed release from
the lien claimant, and (2) payment of the amount identified in the release. See id.
Section 38-1-39 goes on to set forth model consent forms. See id.
Utah was not alone or even the first state to enact a statute that allowed a lien
claimant to waive or abrogate lien rights. Again, California provides guidance for the
policy reasons for allowing a claimant to contract away its lien rights. Discussing the
problems with a blanket prohibition on waiver or abrogation of lien rights, the California

1

The statute discussed in Bentz was later repealed. Thus, the specific holding of Bentz is
no longer good law in California; however, the policy discussion in Bentz is still accurate
and applicable to the issue in this case.
9

Court of Appeals stated: "the ability of construction lenders to obtain valid releases of
liens was undercut by Bentz Plumbing & Heating v. Favaloro....

Bentz construed

[California's lien waiver prohibition] to render all lien waivers null and void... . The
decision dried up construction loans and plunged construction lending in California into
chaos." Halbert's Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298, 307 (Cal. Ct.
App. 4th 1992) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Like California, Utah adopted
section 38-1-39 to provide lenders with the ability to obtain lien waivers in certain
circumstances and to prevent the problems experienced in California after the Bentz
decision.
Accordingly, prior to the enactment of section 38-1-39, a lien claimant in Utah
could not waive or abrogate lien rights by private agreement under section 38-1-29.
After its enactment in 2007, a lien claimant could waive or abrogate lien rights if the
consent form strictly complied with the requirements of section 38-1-39. In order for an
agreement to be enforceable, however, the claimant had to sign the waiver and receive
the payment set forth in the document. In other words, the lien claimant could waive or
abrogate its rights under the lien statute only if the claimant executed a valid waiver and
only if the claimant was paid as set forth in the waiver. A lien waiver not accompanied
by the identified payment would not be enforceable under section 38-1-39. Accordingly,
section 38-1-39 provides some protection for construction lenders, but it does so in
furtherance of the overall goal of the mechanics' lien statute, which is to protect lien
claimants and assure payment for labor and services provided.

10

II.

The trial court failed to follow the plain language of the statute and stated
policy goals underlying the provisions of the statute.
Notwithstanding the above statutory provisions and the policy underlying the

statute, the trial court determined that a document signed on October 30, 2006 did not
violate the provisions of the 2006 mechanics' lien statute, even though it required the
contractor to waive its statutory right of priority and effectively eliminated the
contractor's ability to enforce its lien right. The trial court avoided the unambiguous
language contained in section 38-1-29 by concluding that a subordination of a statutory
right of priority is not a waiver of rights or privileges granted under the Utah mechanic's
lien statute. Specifically, the trial court stated: "The Completion Guaranty does not,
however, indicate that the provisions of Utah's mechanic's lien statute would not be
'applicable', nor does it indicate Maestro would be 'waiving' any rights under that
statute. In pertinent part, it simply provides that whatever rights Maestro might have
(under the mechanic's lien statute or otherwise) would be subordinate to the bank's rights
under its construction loan." (R. at 298).
In making its ruling, the trial court improperly focused on two factors: (1)
whether a subordination agreement is a waiver, and (2) whether the use of subordination
agreements is an accepted and sanctioned business practice. In so doing, however, the
trial court failed to analyze the plain language of the statute, and it failed to follow the
policy underlying the statute.
First, the trial court improperly focused on whether a subordination agreement is
a waiver which is precluded by the statute. The statutory language, however, covers
11

more than just waivers. If the descriptive clause "including" is removed from section 381-29, the statute simply reads: "The applicability of the provisions of this chapter . . .
may not be varied by agreement." Id. The "including" clause merely describes a smaller
group comprised of waivers that are included in the broader definition in the statute, i.e.
"including the waiver of rights or privileges granted under this chapter." Id.
Accordingly, the trial court improperly focused on whether a subordination agreement
was a waiver. The plain language of the statutes prohibits a lien claimant from varying
any of the provisions of the statute, regardless of the form of the agreement— whether a
waiver, subordination, or guaranty. The trial court erred in its conclusion that a
subordination is not a waiver under the statute.
The statute states that "applicability of the provisions . . . may not be varied by
agreement." Section 38-1-5 specifically grants a lien claimant the right to claim priority
from the date the first work began. This is an exception to the general recording rule, and
it represents an extremely important right and privilege granted by the Utah mechanics'
lien statute. By definition, if one subordinates its right to priority as dictated by the
statute, one has "varied" or "waived" the applicability of the priority provisions of the
statute. A private agreement or contract which subordinates a claimant's right of priority
substantially alters the rights specifically granted by the Utah legislature. In this case,
subordination of the lien claim effectively precludes the lien claim from recovering
because of the lender's contractual priority and subsequent tight to foreclosure any junior
claimants.
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Second, as to accepted practices in the industry, the trial court also erred. The
trial court in its ruling relied in part on its belief that subordination agreements were
necessary in the construction and lending industry to provide lenders some measure of
protection against mechanics' liens. (R. at 299, 343: 3-4) Without such agreements,
lenders would be reticent about providing construction agreements. Accordingly, the
trial court relied on its familiarity with the industry standards when it made its ruling to
uphold the Guaranty of Completion despite the statutory language.
In so doing, however, the trial court ignored the requirements put in place by the
Utah Legislature when it enacted section 38-1-39. Although section 38-1-39 did not
apply to the Guaranty of Completion in this matter, that section is instructive as to the
requirements for a enforceable lien waiver. Under section 38-1-39, a lien waiver must at
the very least be accompanied by a payment to claimant and notice of the terms of the
release/waiver of the lien rights. Neither of these requirements are present in this case.
The Guaranty of Completion does not provide for any guaranty of payment to Maestro
and does not set forth the amount being released by the Guaranty. Absent this critical
material term, the Guaranty is unenforceable even under the limited waiver provisions of
38-1-39.
Furthermore, the Guaranty of Completion requires the guarantor to compromise
its right to payment from the borrower. In other words, not only does the Guaranty of
Completion not provide for payment to the guarantor, but it actually compromises the
guarantor's ability to be paid or to collect in the event of non-payment. Thus, the
Guaranty of Completion is clear contract of adhesion. It is a requirement for the
13

construction loan on which the guarantor is relying on for payment; however, it is a onesided document which then takes away the guarantor's right to payment and ability to
collect.
The mechanics' lien statutes contained lien waiver prohibitions for precisely this
reason. Banks and lenders were requiring contractors to waive, subordinate, and abrogate
their lien rights as a prerequisite to a lender financing the project. Thus, the contractor
was in a catch-22. Should the contractor refuse to sign the guaranty and waiver, the
lender would refuse to finance the project, and the contractor would be out of work. Or,
the contractor could sign the guaranty and waiver, however, the contractor would be
compromising its right to payment and ability to collect unpaid sums. The mechanics'
lien statutes initially addressed this problem by prohibiting any waiver or abrogation of
lien rights by private agreement. Later, the legislature amended the statutes to allow
waivers in limited circumstances, but only after the claimant had been paid for its work or
materials on the project.
Before the trial court, the bank relied on Richards v. Security Pac. Nat 7 Bank,
849 P.2d 606 (Utah 1993) for the proposition that Utah has sanctioned the use of
subordination agreements in these circumstances. The Richards opinion merely states in
dicta that a lender may use a subordination agreement. See id at 612. The opinion,
however, was issued before the legislature enacted either section 38-1-29 or 38-1-39.
Accordingly, to the extent it had any relevance to the issue in this matter, its holding has
been superseded by statute. Further, the opinion for the most part would support Olsen
over the bank.
14

In Richards, the Utah Court of Appeals stated: "Given the legislature's creation
of a specific statutory preference for mechanic's lienholders, if the question is framed as
a choice between which party should receive a windfall, we believe it should be the
mechanic's lienholder." Id. Indeed, the same factual considerations that supported the
Court's statement in Richards are present in this case. Specifically, the bank has received
the value of Maestro's work "without having paid anything for it." Id. Additionally, the
bank could have easily examined the property before making the loan. Had the bank
taken this simple step, the bank would have discovered both that Maestro had
commenced visible work and that the city had inspected the work and issued a footings
and foundation report. All of these events occurred prior to the bank recording its trust
deed. Furthermore, the lien was recorded and known to all at the time the bank
commenced foreclosure and when the home was later sold to the Chases. Accordingly,
the Richards opinion does not support the bank in this case: "Given the statutory
protection granted mechanic's lienholders, it is much more appropriate to have
commercial lenders bear the burden of protecting themselves." Id.
In making its ruling, the trial court wholly failed to adhere to the plain language
of the statute in effect at the time the Guaranty of Completion was signed, and it wholly
failed to follow the principles underlying the mechanics' lien statute. The statute is to be
liberally construed in favor of lien claimants in order to protect their right to be paid. The
trial court did not address or follow the overriding policy concern of protecting lien
claimants. In failing to do so, the trial court's ruling was error.

15

III.

The trial court misapplied Utah law and failed to acknowledge the issues of
fact regarding the Guaranty of Completion.
The trial court erred when it concluded that Maestro's failure to read the

Guaranty of Completion trumped any issues of fact regarding the lender's
misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement regarding its execution. Utah has long
recognized the rule of law which provides '"that a person will be given relief from fraud
even though he failed to read the contract before signing if he was by some act or artifice
induced to refrain from reading it, or if because of the circumstances he was justified in
relying on the representations made.'" Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607
P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1980) {quoting Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P.2d 134, 137
(1945)); see also The Cantamar, L.L.C v. Champagne, 2006 UT App 321, ft 2 0-24, 142
P.3d 140. The trial court erred in preventing plaintiffs from asserting a fraudulent
inducement defense to the jury when disputed issues of fact existed regarding the
circumstances surrounding Maestro's signature on the Guaranty of Completion.
In making its ruling, the trial court relied on Utah law which provides that "'one
party to an agreement does not have a duty to ensure that the other party has a complete
and accurate understanding of all terms embodied in a written contract.'" (R. at 299
{quoting Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 73 (Utah 1998)). The trial court buttressed its
conclusion by stating that plaintiffs had provided no evidence that Maestro was "coerced,
or otherwise forced" into signing the Guaranty. Moreover, the trial court concluded that
there was no evidence Maestro's reliance on any alleged misrepresentations was
reasonable. (R. at 299). In summary, the trial court stated: "Accordingly, this Court is in
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a position to summarily dismiss Plaintiffs claim that it was fraudulently induced to sign
the Completion Guaranty. Maestro's failure to read the Completion Guaranty, under
Utah law, is no defense." (R. at 299).
The trial court erred as to the applicable law and it erred as to whether genuine
issues of fact existed. Olsen submitted un-contradicted testimony to the trial court that
indicated the bank official opened the Guaranty to the last page and requested Luke
Watkins sign the form without reading it. (R. at 138). Further, the bank official
represented the document was fairly perfunctory in nature and simply required Maestro to
finish the project if the borrower died or was not around. (R. at 138). Accordingly,
neither Watkins, nor anyone else at Maestro Builders, read the Guaranty of Completion.
The failure to read the document was because the bank induced Maestro to not read the
document by misrepresenting what the document meant.
In addition, the representations made by the bank in order to induce Maestro's
signature are consistent with the title of the document. The document is conspicuously
titled: "Guaranty of Completion and Performance." Nowhere in the title nor anywhere on
the first page of the document is the guarantor advised that the document is subordinating
the guarantor's right to payment and altering lien rights. If the document was titled
"Waiver of Lien Rights," the bank might have a stronger argument; however, the issue
would focus on the reasonableness of Maestro's reliance on the bank's misrepresentation
when handed a document with a contradictory title. The issue of reasonable reliance is
still a jury question and not an issue the trial court can rule on as a matter of law. See
Berkeley Bank, 607 P.2d at 801 (issue of reasonable reliance is for jury).
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The trial court relied on Maestro's failure to read the documents as the basis for
rejecting the defense. The trial court failed to adequately address the well established
policy adopted by the Utah Supreme Court: "It can hardly be maintained that the general
moral level of business and other financial relationships would be enhanced by a rule of
law which would allow a person to defend against a willful, deliberate fraud by stating,
' You should not have trusted or believed me' or 'Had you not been so gullible you would
not have been (so) deceived.'" Berkeley Bank, 607 P.2d at 805. Yet, this is precisely
what the bank argued and the trial court allowed. In addition, the trial court made all
inferences of the facts in the bank's favor.
The Guaranty of Completion is a three page document which contains a series of
boilerplate requirements. Its title, Guaranty of Completion, is consistent with the lender's
representation that it merely required Maestro to compete the project, and does not
suggest that it is a waiver of any rights. The Guaranty of Completion is entirely onesided in favor of the bank, and it is inconsistent with the actual construction project. For
example, as the bank knew prior to entering into the construction loan, this project was a
cost plus project. Maestro could not represent and warrant the actual final costs of the
project—unlike a fixed cost project where the owner and builder agree in advance to a
specific cost. Nonetheless, this was one of the many "guarantees" required by the
document.
Moreover, Watkins was in no position to request different terms for the
construction loan or to the documents he had to sign. Maestro and Watkins had agreed to
build a house for Hood, and the construction loan was necessary to finance the project.
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Hood had already told Maestro that he had obtained financing for the project, and
Maestro had started its work. The bank was not going to edit the document to suit
Maestro or Watkins. In other words, Maestro and Watkins were in no position to demand
changes from the bank. The bank officer simply presented a series of signature pages to
Watkins for his signature, and he represented to Watkins what these documents meant.
The only factual allegation in the record indicated that Watkins had not read the
Guaranty of Completion when he signed it. Watkins' uncontradicted testimony was that
he did not read the Guaranty of Completion because the bank officer represented the
effect of the document to him and simply handed him the signature page to sign. The
bank offered no evidence to contradict Watkins' testimony. The trial court ignored this
fact, concluded Watkins' reliance on the misrepresentation was not reasonable, and relied
on Watkins' statement that he did not read the document to find that he could not raise a
defense to the document. The trial court erred when it ignored disputed issues of fact and
resolved inferences in favor of the bank, and it compounded its error by failing to follow
established Utah law. The issue whether the Guaranty of Completion was validly entered
into and an enforceable document was for the jury to decide.
CONCLUSION
In granting the bank's motion for summary judgment, the trial court committed
reversible error in two respects. First, the trial court ignored the plain language of the
statute which precludes the parties from contracting away any lien rights. The trial court
avoided this statutory prohibition by finding a subordination of a statutory right of
priority is not a waiver or alteration of lien rights.
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When presented with un-refuted testimony to demonstrate the lien claimant's
signature on the document was induced by the lender's misrepresentation of the
document's effect, the trial court ignored Utah law which renders agreements induced by
fraud or artifice unenforceable. Moreover, the trial court resolved disputed issues of fact
and made factual inferences in favor of the moving party in order to grant the motion.
The trial court's ruling is not supported by Utah law and should be reversed.
DATED this / Q

day of February, 2010.

WgHAtfpS BRANDT MILLER NELSON

/

Y^TFETERSON
PAUL\P. BURGHARDT
Attorneys for Appellant
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

BRADLEY J. OLSEN, an individual;
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, INC.
ADMINISTRATOR FOR ROTH IRA #
6765, a Utah corporation; AMERICAN
PENSION SERVICES, INC.,
ADMINISTRATOR FOR ROTH IRA #
7453, a Utah corporation,
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DOUG CHASE, an individual, CHANTEL
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Defendants.
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The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the Honorable David M. Connors
on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment on May 27,2009. Paul Burghardt appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs Bradley J. Olsen,
American Pension Services, Inc., Administrator for Roth IRA # 6765 and American Pension

'
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o

Services, Administrator for Roth IRA # 7453. Ronald G, Russell and Royce B. Covington
appeared on behalf of Defendants Doug Chase, Chantel Chase and Bank of the West. At the
conclusion of oral argument, the Court allowed the parties to submit supplemental briefing. On
July 20, 2009, after a review of the file in this case, including all supplemental memoranda,
and after consideration of the oral argument made before the Court, the Court issued its Ruling
Granting Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and for the reasons stated therein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows;
1, Defendants* Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiffs*
Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
2. Plaintiffs* claims are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
3, The Lis Pendens recorded by Plaintiffs on September 3, 2008 with the Davis County
Recorder at Entry Number 2390115, Book 4607, Page 771-772, is released.
4. Plaintiffs* Notice of Mechanic's Lien recorded on March 31, 2008 with the Davis
County Recorder at Entry Number 2353276, Book 4501, Page 1162-1163, and Plaintiffs'
Amended Notice of Mechanic's Lien recorded with the Davis County Recorder on July 18,
2008 at Entry Number 2380343, Book 4576, Page 436-437, were subordinate to First Utah
Bank's trust deed recorded on November 9, 2006. First Utah Bank foreclosed on its trust deed
on April 17,2008 and transferred the property free and clear of Plaintiffs Mechanic's Liens.
The property at issue is located at 142 North 3475 West, Layton, Utah 84041, and more
particularly identified as follows:
ALL OF LOT 116, ROCKWELL ESTATES SUBDIVISION, LAYTON CITY,
DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF ON
FILE AND OF RECORD IN THE OFFICE OF THE DAVIS COUNTY RECORDER.
Parcel ID No. 12-553-0116

5. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §38-1-18, Defendants are hereby awarded
judgment against Bradley J, Olsen, American Pension Services, Inc., Administrator for Roth
IRA # 6765 and American Pension Services, Administrator for Roth IRA # 7453, in the
amount of their reasonable costs in the amount of $j3£Li£? ^ d reasonable attorney's fees in

C^~

OdtfC the amount of $ VX p^lZ^UTi which costs and fees the Court finds were necessarily expended
'Sao. £*fc**j *F <***+* j^r<t AoiBe^/TX .

%UXM-

by Defendants in defending against the claims of Plaintiffs ./This judgment may be augmented
in the amount of such additional attorney's fees and costs that may be incurred by collecting
this judgment, as established by affidavit of counsel.
6. This judgment resolves all claims herein and is entered as the final judgment.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT ENTERED this

^

day of

(P^la^rz^

BY THE COURT

Judge David M. Us
Second District Court JuHge''""
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON

Paul Burghardt
Attorneyfor Bradley Jl Olsen, American Pension Services, Inc.,
Administrator for Roth IRA # 6765 and American Pension Services,
Administrator for Roth IRA # 7453
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT, DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, LAYTON DEPARTMENT

BRADLEY J. OLSEN, an individual;
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, INC,
ADMINISTRATOR FOR ROTH IRA #
6765, a Utah corporation; AMERICAN
PENSION SERVICES, INC.,
ADMINISTRATOR FOR ROTH IRA #
7453, a Utah corporation
Plaintiff,

vs.
DOUG CHASE, an individual, CHANTEL
CHASE, an individual; and BANK OF THE
WEST, a California corporation,

RULING GRANTING CROSS-MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Case No.: 080603461

Judge: DAVID M. CONNORS

RECEIVfeU
JUL 2 3
Richards, Brandt
Miller & Nelson

Defendants.
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
filed on December 03,2008, and Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March
10, 2009. The Court heard oral argument on the competing motions and, at the conclusion of
oral argument, allowed the parties to file supplemental post-argument memoranda. Aiter a
review of the file in this case, including all supplemental memoranda, the Court finds that there
are no issues of material fact in dispute that would prevent the entry of summary judgment in
favor of Defendants on their cross-motion.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below,

Defendants' Cross-Motion is GRANTED and Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
is DENIED.
The detennining issues in the action all relate back ultimately to a construction agreement
between Matt Hood and Maestro Builders and the construction financing that was obtained in
connection with that agreement. The submitted memoranda focus on the issue of whether or not
a mechanic's lien can be expressly subordinated to a subsequently executed lien or mortgage. In
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particular, the dispute centers on a Guaranty of Completion and Performance that was signed by
Maestro Builders in favor of First Utah Bank.
While the recitations of facts in the parties' memoranda indicate that there are some
lingering factual disputes, those disputes are not material to the Court's ruling. In reciting the
facts below, the Court makes no findings of fact and will simply rely on the facts as stated in the
memoranda. Where there is some dispute between the parties, the Court will note the dispute
and accept, for purposes of this ruling, the facts as asserted by the Plaintiff.
In approximately August of 2006, Matt Hood, as buyer, and Maestro Builders, LLC
(hereinafter "Maestro"), as seller and builder, entered into a contract for the construction of a
residence in Layton, Utah (the "Property"). To finance the construction, Matt Hood borrowed
money from First Utah Bank (the "Construction Loan"). The Construction Loan was secured by
a deed of trust on the Property that was recorded on November 9, 2006. There ts some dispute
between the parties as to when construction activities commenced. However, for purposes of
this ruling, the Court accepts Plaintiffs assertion that construction activities; began no later than
November 1, 2006, several days prior to the closing of the Construction Loan. At the closing,
Maestro was asked to sign a document titled "Guaranty of Completion and Performance" (the
"Completion Guaranty").

Maestro in feet signed the Completion Guaranty through its

authorized representative, Mr. Luke Watkins. At the closing, Mr. Watkins did not read the form
and signed it relying on the closing officer's description using words to the effect of "this just
tells the bank—or tells us that if the home owner dies that you'll finish the [home] for us, you'll
guarantee the completion of the home and that you'll finish the home if the home owner is not
around". Among other things the Completion Guaranty contained the following language:
Guarantor [Maestro] agrees that the Loan, whether now existing or hereafter created,
shall be superior to any claim that Guarantor may now have or hereafter acquire against
Borrower, whether or not Borrower becomes insolvent. Guarantor hereby expressly

subordinates any claim Guarantor may have against Borrower, upon any account
whatsoever, to any claim that Lender may now or hereafter have against Borrower.
After the closing of the Construction Loan, Maestro submitted no less than ten draw
requests to First Utah Bank, which requests were paid from the proceeds of the Construction
Loan. Ultimately, however, Matt Hood failed to pay Maestro in full for the work performed.
The Court notes that the Defendants assert that due to over-billing or wrongful accounting,
Maestro may actually have been paid in full. For purposes of this ruling, however, the Court
accepts Plaintiffs' assertion that Maestro was not paid in full for its work. At some point the
Construction Loan came to be in default and First Utah Bank began foreclosure proceedings
under its trust deed Maestro recorded a Notice of Lien on the Property on March 31,2008. On
April 17,2008, First Utah Bank sold the Property in a non-judicial trust deed foreclosure sale to
Skyline Real Estate. Skyline subsequently sold the Property to Doug and Chantel Chase. In
connection with the sale, a deed in favor of the Chases was recorded July 18,2008. The Chases*
purchase wasfinancedby Bank of the West, which recorded two trust deeds on the Property on
July 18, 2008, in a combined total amount of $323,000.00. Also on July 18, 2008, just prior to
the recording of the deed to the Chases and the trust deeds in favor of Bank of the West, Maestro
filed an Amended Notice of Lien against the Property, asserting a lien in the amount of
$60,614.78.
Maestro's interest in its mechanic's lien was subsequently assigned to the Plaintiffs
herein. This action was commenced by the Plaintiffs seeking to foreclose the mechanic's lien.
Plaintiffs have filed a motion for partial summary judgment asking the Court to rule as a matter
of law that their lien is prior to the trust deed liens in favor of Bank of the West. The Chases and
Bank of the West, who are the Defendants in the action, oppose Plaintiffs* motion and have filed
their own cross-motion for summary judgment asking this Court to rule as a matter of law that
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the mechanic's lien was extinguished by the First Utah Bank foreclosure sale and is therefore
unenforceable against the Property.
In essence, these competing motions ask the Court for a declaration on the relative
priority of Maestro's mechanic's lien and the construction loan trust deed in ifavor of First Utah
Bank. The current parties' positions are derivative of those original actorsPlaintiffs argue that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§38-1-5 and 38-1-29 the subordination
provisions of the Completion Guaranty were not enforceable and, therefore, did not operate to
subordinate Maestro's mechanic's lien to First Utah Bank's trust deed. In essence, Plaintiffs
argue that to the extent that the Completion Guaranty seeks to alter or waive rights otherwise
granted to Maestro under Utah's mechanic's lien statute, it is void. Plaintiffs further argue that
First Utah Bank fraudulently misrepresented to Mr. Watkins the nature of the Completion
Guaranty document. Thisfraudulentmisrepresentation, according to Plaintiffs, invalidates the
agreement.
Defendants argue, on the other hand, that, the Completion Guaranty specifically provides
that Maestro would subordinate any liens to First Utah Bankfs trust deed used to secure the
construction financing. Defendants argue that such subordination is not inconsistent with Utah's
statutory scheme and should be upheld.
Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may render summary
judgment when the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a maitter of law. Clearly there is no dispute that the
Completion Guaranty was signed by Maestro. Nor is there any dispute that, if it is enforceable
as written, the Construction Guaranty provides that Maestro's mechanic's lien would be
subordinate to the lien of First Utah Bank's construction loan-related deed of trust.
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The primary legal issue to be decided is whether the subordination of Maestro's mechanic's
lien was permitted under Utah law as it stood in 2006, thus maldng it junior in priority to First Utah
Bank's trust deed, As a secondary matter, the Court must decide if the fects asserted by Plaintifis
would be sufBcient to support a conclusion that the Completion Guaranty should be set aside as
unenforceable because one party to the contract, in this case Maestro, subsequently asserts that it did
not realize what the contract really meant and chose not to read die contract based on statements by
the other party's representative supposedly summarizing the provisions of the contract.

The first issue requires the Court to interpret §38-1 -29 of the Utah Code. That section reads as
follows:

The applicability of the provisions of this chapter, including the waiver of rights or privileges
granted under this chapter, may not be varied by agreement
The Completion Guaranty does not, however, indicate that the provisions of Utah's mechanic's lien
statute would not be "applicable", nor does it indicate that Maestro would be "waiving" any rights
uncjer that statute. In pertinent part, it simply provides that whateverrightsMaestro might have (under
the mechanic's lien statute or otherwise) would be subordinate to the bank's rights under its
construction loan. Maestro undisputably received a specific and direct benefit from this subordination
in die sense that it received payment from the construction loan funds of at least ten draw requests.

Defendants note that Utah courts have sanctioned the use of lien subordination agreements by
construction lenders, at least in dictum. In Richards v. Security National Bank, 849 ?2d 606 (Utah
App. 1993), the Utah Court of Appeals specifically encouraged the use of subordination agreements
by lenders to protect themselves from identifiable mechanic's lien claims. The Court in Richards
reasoned that "Commercial lenders can easily examine the property, ask specific questions regarding
the existence of intervening lienholders, acquire subordination agreements with any lienholders that
exist, or, in many cases, assume the rights of the earlier lender by assignment" Id. at 612 and n.6
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While the Richards case was decided prior to the enactment of §38-1-29, the court's reasoning, as it
relates to the use of subordination agreements, continues to make business sense. In the absence of
specific language in the statute invalidating such subordination agreements, this Court cannot
conclude that §384-29 precludes the common business practice of having a specifically identified
potential mechanic's lien claimant subordinate the priority of its lien to a construction lender from
whom that very same contractor will then receive payment of its constniction draw requests.
The second matter of law to be decided is whether, under the facts of this case, the Completion
Guaranty might be found to be unenforceable due to statements made by the bank's representative at
the time Maestro's representative was asked to sign the document Even if Plaintiffs' statement of
facts were taken at face value, it would not support a conclusion that the Completion Guaranty should
be set aside. It is well-settled law that
"one party to an agreement does not have a duty to ensure that the other party has a
complete and accurate understanding of all terms embodied in a written contract. Rather,
each party has the burden to read and understand the terms of a contract before he or she
affixes his or her signature to it A party may not sign a contract and thereafter assert
ignorance or failure to read the contract as a defense."
Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 73 (Utah 1998). Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence
that Maestro's representative was coerced, or otherwise forced, to sign the Completion Guaranty
without taking the time to read it and understand it. Nor is there any evidence that it would have
been reasonable for Maestro's representative to rely on any statements made by the bank's
representative about the document before signing it. Accordingly, this Court is in a position to
summarily dismiss Plaintiffs claim that it was fraudulently induced to sign the Completion
Guaranty, Maestro's failure to read the Completion Guaranty, under Utah law, is no defense.
As a result of the foregoing, Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED.

At the time of the trust deed foreclosure, Maestro's mechanic's lien was

subordinate to First Utah Bank's trust deed and the Property was, therefore, properly conveyed to
6

the Chasesfreeof Maestro's lien. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.
As the prevailing parties, Defendants are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and
costs pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §38-1-18. Defendant's counsel is instructed to prepare,
circulate and submit an appropriate form of order and to submit an affidavit of fees and costs

SIGNED and DATED this jP_ day of July, 2009.
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Borrower:

M A T T HOOD (SSN: 52a-4i-8935)

4648 W. INDIA SPRINGS CIRCLE
SOUTO JORDAN, UT 84095

Lender:

First Utah Bank
Cocwimer Construction Loan Department
11025 South State Street
Sandy, ITT 84070

Guarantor: MAESTRO BUILDERS L L C .

P.O. BOX 814
KAYSVlLLE, UT 84037
THIS GUARANTY OF COMPLETION AND PERFORMANCE (•Guaranty") Is made as of October 30, 2006, by MAESTRO BUILDERS L L C .
(•Guarantor*) to and for the benefit of First Utah Bank ("Lender").
THE LOAN. Borrower proposes to borrow from Lender the principal amount of Two Hundred Ninety-nine Thousand A 00/100 DoHars ($299,000.00)
pursuant to the ternis and conations of the Construction Loan AgreemenL As a condition and inducement to making the Loan, Borrower has
requested that Guarantor duty execute and deliver this Guaranty guaranteeing the lien-free completion of the construction of the Project and the
performance of other covenants, which are aH considered by Lender to be material regarding Lender's decision to make the Loan,
GUARANTY. Guarantor hereby uixxxxfrtionalry and absolutely warrants and guarantees to Lender that (a) construction of the Project shaft be
commenced and shall be substantia^ completed within the time limits set forth In the Construction Loan Agreement; (b) the Project sbafl be
constructed and completed in accordance with the Loan Documents and the Plans and Specifications, without substantial deviation therefrom unless
approved by Lender In writing; (c) except for Lender's security agreements, the Project w * be constructed and completed free and clear of aR Bens
and encumbrances, ratixfing without limitation all mechanics* Dens, materialmen's liens, and equitable liens; and (d) a l costs of constructing the
Project win be paid when due, and no stop notices shall be served on Lender.
OBLIGATIONS OF GUARANTOR UPON EVENT OF DEFAULT. Should an Event of Default (as defined in any Construction Loan Agreement) occur or
if the Project shall not be constructed and completed as provided above, Guarantor shaS: (a) oSigentfy proceed to cure such default and procure
completion of the Project at Guarantor's sole cost and expense; (b) fufly pay and discharge afl claims for labor perfoimed and material and services
furnished in <x>nnection with the construction of the Project; and (c) pay such amounts as may be necessary to release and dscharge all claims of stop
notices, mechanics* liens, materialmen's liens, and equitable liens, if any, that may come hto existence in connection with the construction of the
ProjecL
NATURE OF GUARANTY. This Guaranty is an original and independent obligation of Guarantor, separate and distinct from Borrower's obligations to
Lender under the Loan Documents. The obligations of Guarantor to Lender under this Guaranty are direct and primary, regardless of the validity or
enforceability of the Loan Documents. This Guaranty k for the benefit of Lender, and is not for the benefit of any thkd party. This Guaranty shall
continue until (A) the Project has been completed, free and clear of all fims and encumbrances as provided above, and (B) a l obligations of
Guarantor to Lender under this Guaranty have been performed in full.
GUARANTOR'S AUTHORIZATION TO LENDER. Guarantor authorizes Lender, without notice or demand and without lessening Guarantor's liabifty
under this Guaranty, from timetotime: (a) to make or approve changes to the Ptans and Specifications; (b) to make modifications to the Construction
Loan Agreement and the other Loan Documents; (c) to make one or more additional secured or unsecured loans to Borrower; (d) to repeatedy after,
compromise, renew, extend, accelerate, or otherwise change the time for payment or other terms of the Loan or any part of the Loan, including
increases and decreases of the rate of interest on the Loan; extensions may be repeated and may beforlonger than the original loan term; (e)totake
and hold security for the payment of the Loan or this Guaranty, and exchange, enforce, wahre, and release any such security, with or without the
substitution of new collateral; (t) to release, substitute, agree not to sue, or deal with any one or more of Borrower's sureties, endorsers, or other
guarantors on any terms or in any manner Lender may choose; (g)todetermine how, when, and what application of payments and credits shall be
made on the Loan; (h) to apply such security and direct the order or manner of sale thereof, including withoutfinratation,any nonjudicial sale permitted
by the terms of the controlling security agreement or deed of trust, as Lender k> Lender's discretion may determine; (i)tosell, transfer, assign or grant
participations in aS or any part of the Loan; and (j)toassign or transfer this Guaranty in whole or in part.
GUARANTOR'S REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES. Guarantor represents and warrants to Lender that (a) no representations or agreements
of any kind have been made to Guarantor which would limit or qualify in any way the terms of this Guaranty; (b) this Guaranty is executed at
Borrower's request and not at the request of Lender to induce Lender to disburse the Loan to Borrower pursuant to the teons of the Loan Documents
and that Lender would not make and disburse the LoantoBorrower pursuant to the Loan Documents were it notforthe execution and delivery of this
Guaranty; (c) Guarantor has not and will not. without the prior written consent of Lender, sefl, lease, assign, encumber, hypothecate, transfer, or
otherwise dispose of ail or substantially aB of Guarantor's assets, or any interest therein; (d) neither the execution nor the delivery of this Guaranty nor
compliance with the terms hereof wiU conflict with or result in the breach of any law or statute, wBi constitute a breach or default under any agreement
or instrument to which Guarantor may be a party, or wW result inti)ecreation or imposition of any charge or lien upon any property or assets of
Guarantor; (e) Lender has made no representation to Guarantor as to fre creditworthiness of Borrower; (f) the most recent financial statements of
Guarantor heretofore delivered to Lender are true and correct in all material respects and fairly present the financial condition of Guarantor as of the
respective dates thereof, and no material adverse change has occurred In the financial condition of Guarantor since the date of the most recent
financial statements; and (g) Guarantor has established adequate means of obtaining from Borrower on a continuing basis information regarding
Borrower's financial condition Guarantor agrees to keep adequately informed from such means of any facts, events, or circumstances which might in
any way affect Guarantor's risks under this Guaranty, and Guarantor further agrees that, absent a request for information, Lender shall have no
obligationtodisclose to Guarantor any information or documents acquired by Lender in the course of Its relationship with Borrower.
GUARANTOR'S WAIVERS. Except as prohibited by applicable law. Guarantor waives anyrighttorequire Lender: (A) to make any presentment, J j J
protest, demand, or notice of any kind, including notice of any nonpayment of the Loan or of any nonpayment related to any security agreement, or v>l
notice of any action or nonaction on the part of Borrower, Lender, any surety, endorser, or other guarantor in connection with the Loan or ki connection
with the creation of new or additional loans or obligations; (B) to resort for payment ortoproceed dkectiy or at once agahst any person, Including
Borrower or «ny other guarantor, (C) to proceed directly against or exhaust any collateral hekJ by Lender from Borrower, any other guarantor, or any
other person (D) to give notice of the terms, time, and place of any public or private sale of personal property security held by Lender from Borrower
or to comply with any other applicable provisfons of the Uniform Comrnercial Cede; (E) to pursue any otfwr remedy within Lender's power, or <f> to CQ
commit any act or omission of any kind, or at any time, with respect to any matter whatsoever.

o
o
o

D

Guarantor also waives and agrees not to assert or take advantage of (A) any right (including-8ieright,if any, under Utah's one-action rule as set forth L L
in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 78-37-1) to require Lendertoproceed against or exhaust any security held by Lender at any time ortopursue
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any other remedy in Lender's power before proceeding against Guarantor; (B) the release or surrender of any security held for the payments of the
Loan indebtedness; or (C) any defense based upon an election of remedies (including, if available, an election of remedies to proceed by non-judicial
foreclosure) by Lender which destroys or otherwise impairs the subrogation rights of Guarantor or the right of Guarantor to proceed against Borrower
for reimbursement, or both.
Guarantor further waives and agrees not to assert or claim at any time any deductions to the amount guaranteed under this Guaranty for any claim of
setoff, counterclaim, counter demand, recoupment, or similar right, whether such claim, demand, or right may be asserted by the Borrower, the
Guarantor, or both.
GUARANTOR'S UNDERSTANDING WITH RESPECT TO WAIVERS. Guarantor warrants and agrees that each of the waivers set forth above is made
with Guarantor's full knowledge of Guarantor's significance and consequences and that, under the circumstances, the waivers are reasonable and not
contrary to public policy or law. If any such waiver is determined to be contrary to any applicable law or public policy, such waiver shall be effective
only to the extent permitted by law.
RIGHT OF SETOFF. To the extent permitted by applicable law, Lender reserves a right of setoff in all Guarantor's accounts with Lender (whether
checking, savings, or some other account). This includes aB accounts Guarantor holds jointly with someone else and all accounts Guarantor may open
in the future. However, this does not include any IRA or Keogh accounts, or any trust accounts for which setoff would be prohibited by law. Guarantor
authorizes Lender, to the extent permitted by applicable law, to hold these funds if there is a default, and Lender may apply the funds in these accounts
to pay what Guarantor owes under the terms of this Guaranty.
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES. If Guarantor shall fail to perform promptly as provided in this Guaranty, Lender shalhhave the following rights and remedies:
Perform Work. Lender, at its option, but without any obligation to do so, may proceed to perform on behalf o< Guarantor any and all work on the
Project and to pay any costs incurred in connection with the work. Guarantor, upon Lender's demand, shall promptly pay to Lender all such sums
expended together with interest thereon at the interest rate set forth in ithe Note.
Cure Defaults. Lender, at its option, but without any obligation to do so, may cure any defaults, including without limitation, paying any unpaid
bills and liens, including without limitation those for construction, labor, and materials. Guarantor, upon Lender's demand, shall promptly pay to
Lender all such sums expended together with interest thereon at the interest rate set forth in the Note.
Specific Performance. From time to time and without first requiring performance on the part of Bonower and without being required to exhaust
any security held by Lender for the Loan, to require Guarantor specifically to perform Guarantor's obligations under this Guaranty, by action at law
or in equity or both, and further, to collect in any such action, compensation for all loss, cost, damage, injury and expense sustained or incurred by
Lender as a direct or indirect consequence of Borrower's or Guarantor's failure to perform, with interest thereon at the interest rate set forth in the
Note.
Other Rights and Remedies. In addition, Lender shall have and may exercise any or all of the rights and remedies it may have available at law,
in equity, or otherwise.
SUBORDINATION OF BORROWER'S DEBTS TO GUARANTOR. Guarantor agrees that the Loan, whether now existing or hereafter created, shall be
superior to any claim that Guarantor may now have or hereafter acquire against Borrower, whether or not Borrower becomes insolvenL Guarantor
hereby expressly subordinates any claim Guarantor may have against Borrower, upon any account whatsoever, to any claim that Lender may now or
hereafter have against Borrower. In the event of insolvency and consequent liquidation of the assets of Borrower, through bankruptcy, by an
assignment for the benefit of creditors, by voluntary liquidation, or otherwise, the assets of Borrower applicable to the payment of the claims of both
Lender and Guarantor shall be paid to Lender and shall be first applied by Lender to the Loan. Guarantor does hereby assign to Lender all claims
which it may have or acquire against Borrower or against any assignee or trustee in bankruptcy of Borrower; provided however, that such assignment
shall be effective only for the purpose of assuring to Lender full payment in legal tender of the Loaa If Lender so requests, any notes or credit
agreements now or hereafter evidencing any debts or obligations of Borrower to Guarantor shall be marked with a legend that the same are subject to
this Guaranty and shall be delivered to Lender. Guarantor agrees, and Lender is hereby authorized, in the name of Guarantor, from time to time to file
financing statements and continuation statements and to execute documents and to take such other actions as Lender deems necessary or appropriate
to perfect, preserve and enforce its rights under this Guaranty.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS. The following miscellaneous provisions are a part of this Guaranty:
Amendments. This Guaranty, together with any Related Documents, constitutes the entire understanding and agreement of the parties as to the
matters set forth in this Guaranty. No alteration of or amendment to this Guaranty shall be effective unless given in writing and signed by the party
or parties sought to be charged or bound by the alteration or amendmemL
Attorneys' Fees; Expenses. Guarantor agrees to pay upon demand all of Lender's costs and expenses, including Lender's reasonable attorneys'
fees and Lender's legal expenses, incurred *m connection with the enforcement of this Guaranty. Lender may hire or pay someone else to help
enforce this Guaranty, and Guarantor shall pay the costs and expenses of such enforcement Costs and expenses Include Lender's reasonable
attorneys' fees and legal expenses whether or not Lender's salaried employee and whether or not there is a lawsuit, including reasonable
attorneys' fees and legal expenses for bankruptcy proceedings (including efforts to modify or vacate any automatic stay or injunction), appeals,
and any anticipated post-judgment collection services. Guarantor also shall pay all court costs and such additional fees as may be directed by the
court
Caption Headings. Caption headings in this Guaranty are for convenience purposes only and are not to be used to interpret or define the
provisions of this Guaranty.
Governing Law. This Guaranty will be governed by federal law applicable to Lender and, .to the extent not preempted by federal law, the
laws of the State of Utah without regard to Us conflicts of law provisions. This Guaranty has been accepted by Lender in the State of
Utah.
No Waiver by Lender. Lender shall not be deemed to have waived any rights under this Guaranty unless such waiver is given in writing and
signed by Lender. No delay or omission on the part of Lender in exercising any right shall operate as a waiver of such right or any other right A
waiver by Lender of a provision of this Guaranty shall not prejudice or constitute a waiver of Lender's right otherwise to demand strict compliance
with that provision or any other provision of this Guaranty. No prior waiver by Lender, nor any course of dealing between Lender and Guarantor,
shall constitute a waiver of any of Lender's rights or of any of f3uarantor's obligations as Ao any future transactions. Whenever the consent of
Lender is required under this Guaranty, the granting of such consent by Lender in any instance shall not constitute continuing consent to
subsequent instances where such consent is required and in all cases such consent may be granted or withheld in Ihe sole discretion of Lender.
Notices. Unless otherwise provided by applicable law, any notice required to be given under this Guaranty CM required by law shall be given in
writing, and shall be effective when actually delivered in accordance with the law or with this Guaranty, when actually received by telefacsimile
(unless otherwise required by law), when deposited with a nationally recognized overnight courier, or, if mailed, when deposited in the United
States mail, as first class, certified or registered ma3 postage prepaid, cfirected to the addresses shown near trie beginning of this Guaranty. .Any
party may change its address for notices under this. Guaranty by-giving formahwritleii notice to the other parties -specifying that the purpose of the
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notice is to change the party's address. For notice purposes, Guarantor agrees to keep Lender informed at a!I times of Guarantor's current
address. Unless otherwise provided by applicable law, if there is more than one Guarantor, any notice given by Lender to any Guarantor is
deemed to be notice given to all Guarantors.
Interpretation. In all cases where theW is more than one Guarantor, then all words used in this Guaranty in the singular shall be deemed to have
been used in the plural where the context and construction so require; and where there is more than one Guarantor named in this Guaranty or
when this Guaranty is executed by more than one , the words "Guarantor" shall mean all and any one or more of them. Reference to the phrase
"Guarantor" includes the heirs, successors, assigns, and transferees of each of them.
Severability. If a court of competent jurisdiction finds any provision of this Guaranty to be illegal, invalid, or unenforceable as to any
circumstance, that finding shall not maKe the offending provision illegal, invalid, or unenforceable as to any other circumstance. If feasible, the
offending provision shall be considered modified so that H becomes legal, valid and enforceable. If the offending provision cannot be so modified,
it shall be considered deleted from this Guaranty. Unless otherwise required by law, the illegality, invalidity, or unenforceability of any provision ot
this Guaranty shall not affect the legality, validity or enforceability of any other provision of this Guaranty.
Successors and Assigns. Subject to any limitations stated in this Guaranty on transfer of Guarantor's interest, this Guaranty shall be binding
upon and inure to the benefit of the parties, their successors and assigns. If ownership of the Collateral becomes vested in a person other than
Guarantor, Lender, without notice to Guarantor, may deal with Guarantor's successors with reference to this Guaranty and the Loan by way of
forbearance or extension without releasing Guarantor from the obligations of this Guaranty or liability under the Loan.
DEFINITIONS. The following capitalized words and terms shall have the following meanings when used in this Guaranty. Unless specifically stated to
the contrary, all references to dollar amoints shall mean amounts in lawful money of the United States of America. Words and terms used in the
singular shall include the plural, and the plural shall include the singular, as the context may require. Words and terms not otherwise defined in this
Guaranty shall have the meanings attributed to such terms in the Uniform Commercial Code:
Borrower. The word "Borrower* means WATT HOOD and includes all co-signers and co-makers signing the Note and all their successors and
assigns.
Collateral. The word "Collateral" means all of Guarantor's right, title and interest in and to all the Collateral as described in the Collateral
Description section of this Guaranty.
Guarantor. The word "Guarantor me^ns everyone signing this Guaranty, including without limitation MAESTRO BUILDERS L.L.C., and in each
case, any signer's successors and assigns.
Guaranty.

The word "Guaranty' means the guaranty from guarantor, endorser, surety, or accommodation party to Lender, including without

limitation a guaranty of all or part of th« Note.
Lender. The word "Lender" means First Utah Bank, its successors and assigns.
Loan. The word "Loan" means the loan made to Borrower under the Construction Loan Agreement and the Loan Documents as described below.
Note. The word "Note" means the Nota executed by MATT HOOD in the principal amount of $299,000.00 dated October 30, 2006, together with
all renewals of, extensions of, modifications of, refinancings of, consolidations of, and substitutions for the note or credit agreemenL
Plans and Specifications. The words "Plans and Specifications" mean the plans and specifications for the Project which have been submitted to
and initialed by Lender, together with such changes and additions as may be approved by Lender in writing.
ProjecL The word "Project" means the construction, renovation, or other work on the improvements as set forth in the Plans and Specifications.
Related Documents. The words "Belated Documents" mean all promissory notes, credit agreements, loan agreements, environmental
agreements, guaranties, security agreements, mortgages, deeds of trust, security deeds, collateral mortgages, and all other instruments,
agreements and documents, whether now or hereafter existing, executed in connection with the Loan.
EACH UNDERSIGNED GUARANTOR ACKNOWLEDGES HAVING READ ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THIS GUARANTY AND AGREES TO ITS
TERMS. IN ADDfTION, EACH GUARANTOR UNDERSTANDS THAT THIS GUARANTY IS EFFECTIVE UPON GUARANTOR'S EXECUTION AND
DEUVERY OF THIS GUARANTY TO LENDER. NO FORMAL ACCEPTANCE BY LENDER IS NECESSARY TO MAKE THIS GUARANTY
EFFECTIVE. THIS GUARANTY IS DATED OCTOBER 30, 2006.
GUARANTOR:

D^RS L L C .

>-

Srantor for MAESTRO BUILDERS U L C .
LENDER:

FIRST UTAH BANK

Melissa Park, ConstroctirfriHJMlA^ i c e r
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58-1-39. Waiver or impairment of a lien right -- Forms - Scope.
1) As used in this section:
a) "Check" means a payment instrument on a depository institution including:
i) a check;
ii) a draft;
iii) an order; or
iv) other instrument.
b) "Depository institution" is as defined in Section 7-1-103.
c) "Lien claimant" means a person that claims a lien under this chapter.
d) "Receives payment" means, in the case of a restrictive endorsement, a payee has endorsed a check and the check
resented to and paid by the depository institution on which it is drawn.
2) Notwithstanding Section 38-1-29, a written consent given by a lien claimant that waives or limits the lien
mant's lien rights is enforceable only if the lien claimant:
a) (i) executes a waiver and release that is signed by the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized agent; or
ii) for a restrictive endorsement on a check, includes a restrictive endorsement on a check that is:
A) signed by the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized agent; and
B) in substantially the same form set forth in Subsection (4)(d); and
b) receives payment of the amount identified in the waiver and release or check that includes the restrictive
3rsement:
i) including payment by a joint payee check; and
ii) for a progress payment, only to the extent of the payment.
3) (a) Notwithstanding the language of a waiver and release described in Subsection (2), Subsection (3)(b) applies
i) the payment given in exchange for any waiver and release of lien is made by check; and
ii) the check fails to clear the depository institution on which it is drawn for any reason.
b) If the conditions of Subsection (3)(a) are met:
L) the waiver and release described in Subsection (3)(a) is null, void, and of no legal effect; and
ii) the following will not be affected by the lien claimant's execution of the waiver and release:
A) any lien;
B) any lien right;
Z) any bond right;
D) any contract right; or
E) any other right to recover payment afforded to the lien claimant in law or equity.
V) (a) A waiver and release given by a lien claimant meets the requirements of this section if it is in substantially
brm provided in this Subsection (4) for the circumstance provided in this Subsection (4).
}) A waiver and release may be in substantially the following form if the lien claimant is required to execute a
r
er and release in exchange for or to induce the payment of a progress billing:

"UTAH CONDITIONAL WAIVER AND RELEASE UPON PROGRESS PAYMENT
erty Name:
erty Location:
ll\o n+oU ^ r r / ^A^rrvn

roo/u^no

A I nnonnrv i x_

JtahCode
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Jndersigned's Customer:
nvoice/Payment Application Number:
^yment Amount:
}
ayment Period:
To the extent provided below, this document becomes effective to release and the undersigned is considered to
vaive any notice of lien or right under Utah Code Ann., Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens, or any bond right under
Jtah Code Ann., Title 14, Contractors' Bonds, or Section 63G-6-505 related to payment rights the undersigned has on
he above described Property once:
(1) the undersigned endorses a check in the above referenced Payment Amount payable to the undersigned; and
(2) the check is paid by the depository institution on which it is drawn.
This waiver and release applies to a progress payment for the work, materials, equipment, or a combination of work,
naterials, and equipment furnished by the undersigned to the Property or to the Undersigned's Customer which are the
ubject of the Invoice or Payment Application, but only to the extent of the Payment Amount. This waiver and release
loes not apply to any retention withheld; any items, modifications, or changes pending approval; disputed items and
:laims; or items furnished or invoiced after the Payment Period.
The undersigned warrants that the undersigned either has already paid or will use the money the undersigned
eceives from this progress payment promptly to pay in full all the undersigned's laborers, subcontractors, materialmen,
ind suppliers for all work, materials, equipment, or combination of work, materials, and equipment that are the subject
>f this waiver and release.
)ated:
(Company Name)
By:
Its:
"
(c) A waiver and release may be in substantially the following form if the lien claimant is required to execute a
vaiver and release in exchange for or to induce the payment of a final billing:
"UTAH WAIVER AND RELEASE UPON FINAL PAYMENT
^operty Name:
'roperty Location:
Jndersigned's Customer:
nvoice/Payment Application Number:
*ayment Amount:
To the extent provided below, this document becomes effective to release and the undersigned is considered to
vaive any notice of lien or right under Utah Code Ann., Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens, or any bond right under
Jtah Code Ann., Title 14, Contractors' Bonds, or Section 63G-6-505 related to payment rights the undersigned has on
he above described Property once:
(1) the undersigned endorses a check in the above referenced Payment Amount payable to the undersigned; and
(2) the check is paid by the depository institution on which it is drawn.
This waiver and release applies to the final payment for the work, materials, equipment, or combination of work,
materials, and equipment furnished by the undersigned to the Property or to the Undersigned's Customer.
The undersigned warrants that the undersigned either has already paid or will use the money the undersigned
eceives from the final payment promptly to pay in full all the undersigned's laborers, subcontractors, materialmen, and
uppliers for all work, materials, equipment, or combination of work, materials, and equipment that are the subject of
tiis waiver and release.
)ated:
(Company Name)
By:
Its:
"
(d) A restrictive endorsement placed on a check to effectuate a waiver and release described in this Subsection (4)
neets the requirements of this section if it is in substantially the following form:
"This check is a progress/ final payment for property described on this check sufficient for identification.

lorsement of this check is an acknowledgment by the endorser that the waiver and release to which the payment
lies is effective to the extent provided in Utah Code Ann. Subsection 38-l-39(4)(b) or (c) respectively."
^e) (i) If using a restrictive endorsement under Subsection (4)(d), the person preparing the check shall indicate
^ther the check is for a progress payment or a final payment by circling the word "progress" if the check is for a
gress payment, or the word "final" if the check is for a final payment.
'ii) If a restrictive endorsement does not indicate whether the check is for a progress payment or a final payment, it
onsidered to be for a progress payment.
[5) (a) If the conditions of Subsection (5)(b) are met, this section does not affect the enforcement of:
T) an accord and satisfaction regarding a bona fide dispute; or
'ii) an agreement made in settlement of an action pending in any court or arbitration.
V) Pursuant to Subsection (5)(a), this section does not affect enforcement of an accord and satisfaction or settlement
bribed in Subsection (5)(a) if the accord and satisfaction or settlement:
1) is in a writing signed by the lien claimant; and
'ii) specifically references the lien rights waived or impaired.
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